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3 August 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with the Secretary of State,
2 August 1979 (U)

1. The Secretary at the beginning and again at the end of our conversation thanked me very deeply and sincerely for the superb way in which we handled the verification issue. He believes we have defused that in a very effective manner and he felt that we played our role here most professionally. Please pass this to [redacted]
[redacted] and company. (C) 25X1
25X1

2. When I first arrived, Vaky and Bowdler were on hand. There was a great deal of unhappiness over a piece of paper they had in their hands which was the text of what we presented to the Congress on the [redacted]. In effect they felt that they had been taken by surprise and were not ready to agree with all of the specific actions we were contemplating under the finding. They therefore felt that we were putting on a poor show for the Congress to not have our act together. 25X1

a. In addition, Bowdler in particular felt that he had some ideas for [redacted] which were worthy of our consideration and had not been tapped in this process. 25X1

b. Secretary Vance's concern was that we coordinate our efforts more. The Secretary directed Bowdler and Vaky to come up with a paper on how we should do this. (S)

3. I expressed my opinion that the paper we took to the Congress to explain the [redacted] was in essence a paper which we sent to the SCC and, therefore, pointed out that they had seen that paper well in advance of any presentations to the Congress. There was a complaint, however, that in this particular instance the paper presenting the proposed finding did not get circulated by the NSC to the SCC members in advance of the meeting. I further indicated that we were always anxious to gain their views on how we could do covert action


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ORIGINAL CL BY 169947
 DECL REVW ON 3 August 1985
EXT BY ND 6 YRS BY MORI/CDF
REASON [redacted]

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better but that I didn't think it was necessarily a good idea to develop the covert action proposal jointly. The SCC process provided an opportunity for State and others to make an input. The Perspective process gave State an opportunity afterwards to sign off on specific actions that would flow from the covert action proposal. ^{25X1}



6. We had considerable discussion on the latest MX proposal and I'm to hear it tomorrow. It's going to be critically important that we develop our position on whether or not the US proposal is verifiable. (C)

7. The Secretary recommended I get together with Phil Habib after he comes back from his trip to the Caribbean. The Secretary is very pleased with the initial papers Habib has developed on this. (C)

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8. The Secretary asked that we be very alert to anything coming out of Lusaka during the Commonwealth Conference. He would like to get as straight a read-out on that as he can since there will be many different colorations to the official reports. (C)

9. The Secretary also asked for our appraisal of what the Nigerians are up to. (C)

10. We ran out of time. I delivered the blue bags. I didn't get to any of the other items. (U)

11. Leave the Pakistan issue on the agenda, and put it on the agenda for Brzezinski on 3 August. (C)

12. Drop the overflight issue. Drop the Backfire production issue. (C)

13. Drop the Nicaragua Hopkins memo. (C)

[Redacted]

15. Keep the 1962 US-Soviet Understanding issue. (C). 25X1

16. Take items J through Q and screen them down to see if any are still applicable next time I get on the Secretary of State's calendar. There were too many in this case; I couldn't possibly have covered them all. I want two or three or four items for future meetings if we have that many that seem important. (U)

17. I don't know that I want to raise the FBI report. Let me have recommendations. (C)

STANSFIELD TURNER
Director

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